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Considerable academic debate has arisen about the causes of the deteriorating U.S.-
Russia relationship. Despite the early promise for improved relations after the Soviet 
Union’s collapse, Washington and Moscow have struggled to move forward with a 
productive relationship. A constructive relationship has failed to materialize for 
numerous reasons, but one of the most prominent legacy issues for today’s adversarial 
relationship is the original decision to expand NATO in the 1990s and the failure to 
integrate Russia into the post-Cold War European security architecture. This research 
paper is attempting to answer how and why Russia failed to become integrated into 
NATO during the debates surrounding NATO expansion in the 1990s. This paper 
hypothesizes that Russia’s discontentment with the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and 
NATO’s Kosovo campaign served as “rupture points” in the relationship that ultimately 
precluded them from joining. By utilizing a historical methods approach, leveraging 
recently declassified primary source documents, memoirs, diaries and secondary sources, 
this paper constructs a broader narrative about the arguments surrounding PFP and 
NATO involvement in the Balkans, in order to assess the impacts of the Partnership for 
Peace Program and the Kosovo war on Russia’s failure to join NATO. The paper finds 
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The U.S.-Soviet Union Cold War standoff shaped and defined world affairs for the better 
part of 45 years and effectively split the European continent into two distinct spheres of 
influence. Despite the stand-off there was relative stability which was backstopped by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) serving as a guarantor of the peace. However, with the 
crumbling of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
and the dismemberment of the Warsaw Pact, a new period of uncertainty emerged in the late 
1980s and 1990s. At the same time, the upheaval also represented opportunity and the potential 
to reorder Europe’s political and security architectures.  
Given NATO’s primacy as a political and military alliance, questions on both sides of the 
Atlantic naturally emerged about the alliance’s future. NATO was created to provide collective 
security against the Soviet Union, but with the Soviet Union’s collapse, does NATO still have a 
strategic role to play? Should NATO still ensure Europe’s security or should the alliance dissolve 
entirely or should it be reimagined for a new role? Would it be possible for a newly formed 
Russia to be integrated? These questions, and others, would be hotly debated in the U.S. and 
European capitals, and the answers would prove historically consequential. Of the myriad issues 
U.S. and European leaders contended with in the 1990s, perhaps no issue was more 
consequential than the decision to enlarge NATO, which saw the accession of Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic to the alliance in 1999.  
Despite the enormity of NATO’s enlargement, its political and security legacy remains 
contested, with academics, historians and policy makers reaching consensus on some issues, and 
diverging on others. With the passage of time, volumes of books, journal articles, and memoirs 
have been written, each seeking to understand the array of issues surrounding NATO 
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enlargement, arguing that certain causal factors hold the key for understanding what drove 
expansion. 
This paper seeks to examine the interplay between the different arguments and to identify 
the key moments during the NATO enlargement debates that ultimately led to the alliance’s 
expansion. More specifically, this paper will examin the history of NATO enlargement with 
special emphasis on discerning the critical pivot points that served to rupture U.S.-Russia 
relations and precluded Russia from joining NATO. To that end, this paper’s central question is 
how and why did Russia fail to become integrated into NATO during the debates surrounding 
NATO expansion in the 1990s? Given the current contentious state of U.S.-Russian relations, 
and the existing animosity between Russia and NATO, it is hard to imagine that the prospect of 
Russia joining NATO was ever seriously considered or a possibility. But it was. Based on the 
evidence, this author beleives there was a window of opportunity for closer integration and 
greater cooperation, and that both Russia and the U.S. held out hope that one day Russia would 
even join NATO.1 But, the author is also mindful that despite both public and private comments 
about Russia’s potential to join the alliance, one must also consider the possibility that the 
prospect was never taken seriously by either side. That is, while on the surface, both sides may 
have held out hope for Russia joining NATO, we must consider the possibility that membership 
                                                 
1 Most notable evidence of Russia voicing potential to join NATO include Thomas L. Friedman, “Soviet Disarray: 
Yeltsin Says Russia Seeks to Join NATO,” The New York Times, December 21, 1991, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/21/world/soviet-disarray-yeltsin-says-russia-seeks-to-join-nato.html; Boris 
Yeltsin to Bill Clinton, “Yeltsin Letter on NATO Expansion,” 15 September 1993, National Security Archive, 
Washington, D.C. See page 3 https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4390818-Document-04-Retranslation-of-
Yeltsin-letter-on#_edn13; Andrei Kozyrev, “The New Russia and the Atlantic Alliance,” NATO Review 41, no.1 
(1993): 3–6. For U.S. position on Russia joining NATO see: Lin Davis Memo to Secretary of State Christopher, 
“Strategy for NATO's Expansion and Transformation,” 7 September 1993, National Security Archives, Washington, 
D.C. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4390816-Document-02-Strategy-for-NATO-s-Expansion-and; See also 
Anthony Lake Memo to President Clinton pg 71-76, National Security Council and NSC Records Management 
System, “Declassified Documents Concerning NATO Expansion ,” 13 October 1994, Clinton Digital Library, 
https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/57563. 
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was held out as a potential only at a theoretical level, particularly when one could interpret the 
actions by either side throughout the enlargement process as undermining the likelihood of 
Russian membership. However, for the purposes of this paper, this author accepts the evidence in 
the previous note that point to the potential for Russia joining the alliance as the basis for this 
paper even if only considered at a theoretical level as President Yeltsin said.2 Consequently, it is 
worth examining what precluded Russia from joining NATO after the Cold War, as the decisions 
that were undertaken in the 1990s fundamentally reordered the European security landscape, 
altered U.S., NATO, and Russian relations, and inform much of today’s animosities.  
Identifying an appropriate interpretive framework in which to understand NATO 
enlargement poses a unique challenge because no one particular explanation is satisfying enough 
on its own because NATO enlargement must be thought of in terms of interrelated causal factors. 
In examining the historical record, and having reviewed the literature, historians do organize 
their work along several broader categories of inquiry: bureaucratic politics and the role of key, 
influential policy advisors within the Clinton administration; domestic politics; Russian 
perspectives; the role of international crisis, specifically in the Balkans; and lastly, the role of 
George H.W. Bush’s administration in laying the groundwork for NATO expansion during the 
course of negotiations to reunify Germany and their admittance in to NATO.  
This paper will proceed as follows: first, a thorough historiography will be conducted 
using the above categories as an interpretive framework for understanding NATO enlargement, 
identifying the areas of consensus and disagreement, and the pivot-points in expansion that may 
be at the root of Russia’s failure to join NATO. Second, using a historical-methods approach, 
examining primary and secondary sources, memoirs and other first-hand accounts, the paper will 
                                                 
2 Boris Yeltsin to Bill Clinton, “Yeltsin Letter on NATO Expansion,” 3. 
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paint a picture of the various debates, and the decision-making process surrounding enlargement 
within the Clinton administration. Similar analysis will be done from a Russian perspective with 
particular attention being paid to how the prospects of NATO expansion were being received in 
Russia as well as opposition to NATO involvement in the Balkans. Lastly, this paper will weave 
together the various data points, discuss its implications and draw conclusions about Russia’s 
failure to join NATO. 
 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Institutional and Bureaucratic Politics 
 A sizable body of research has emerged focusing on the policy-making process within 
President Clinton’s national security and foreign policy apparatus. Notably, there is broad 
consensus among scholars and historians about the importance of internal bureaucratic dynamics, 
arguing that the source of NATO expansion was the result of a small group of influential 
advisors who outmaneuvered the bureaucratic opposition and pushed expansion forward.3  
The most prominent scholarship advancing this line of argument has been pioneered by 
James Goldgeier and Mary Sarotte. Goldgeier was the first to provide a detailed accounting of 
the debates as they happened amongst key players within the interagency, providing us with a 
                                                 
3  By no means exhaustive, but key research includes: James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether but when: The U.S. 
Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 218.; James M. Goldgeier, 
"NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision," Washington Quarterly 21, no. 1 (1998), 85.; Kimberly Marten, 
“Reconsidering NATO Expansion: A Counterfactual Analysis of Russia and the West in the 1990s,” European 
Journal of International Security 3, no. 2, (November 1, 2017): 135-161.; James Goldgeier and Joshua R. Itzkowitz 
Shifrinson, "Evaluating NATO Enlargement: Scholarly Debates, Policy Implications, and Roads Not Taken," 
International Politics 57, no. 3 (2020), 291.;  Kimberly Marten, "NATO Enlargement: Evaluating its Consequences 
in Russia," International Politics 57, no. 3 (2020), 401.; Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO's Door: How the 
Alliance Remade itself for a New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 372.;  Mary Sarotte, "How to 
Enlarge NATO: The Debate Inside the Clinton Administration, 1993–95," International Security 44, no. 1 (2019), 
7.; Gerald B. H. Solomon and Center for Strategic and International Studies, The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-
1997: Blessings of Liberty, Vol. 174 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), 189. 
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thorough timeline of key events. Notably, Goldgeier wrote contemporaneously to NATO 
enlargement, publishing his initial article in 1998, followed by a book in 1999 which provides a 
unique understanding of the events as they were happening.4 However, Sarotte has been aided by 
the passage of time, writing ten years later and able to draw upon recently declassified material, 
newly released correspondence and other previously unavailable primary source documents.5  
Goldgeier and Sarotte advance our understanding about NATO enlargement by framing 
the debate along a continuum of actions. While there is widespread agreement amongst the 
scholars on the broad contours of the administration’s deliberations, and who the key players 
were, they each identify and emphasize different pivot points worth considering separately. For 
example, in Goldgeier’s analysis, he argues that the decision to enlarge NATO was not a single 
decision, but rather a series of decisions and policy pronouncements that evolved during three 
key phases between 1993 and 1994.6 Sarotte uses a similar framing device for her analyses and 
constructs her argument in terms of “rachets” that focus on “three decision making junctures.”7 
Both authors cover similar ground and recount the same stories in each of their second and third 
phases and ratchets respectively, providing the reader with a holistic understanding of the time 
period. 
In Goldgeier’s first phase, he focuses his analysis on the bureaucratic debates that pitted 
supporters on the National Security Council (NSC) and a small coterie at Department of State 
(DOS), against opponents at the Department of Defense (DOD) and State, and the emergence of 
the Partnership for Peace program (PFP) ahead of the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels. 
Conversely, Sarotte identifies her first “rachet” as pre-dating the Clinton administration and 
                                                 
4 Goldgeier, Not Whether but when: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO, 85. 
5 Sarotte, "How to Enlarge NATO: The Debate Inside the Clinton Administration, 1993–95,” 7. 
6 Goldgeier, “NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision,” 86. 
7 Sarotte, "How to Enlarge NATO”, 10. 
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demonstrates that the George H.W. Bush administration’s efforts in ensuring NATO would 
remain the most viable alliance in Europe proved critical in setting the foundation for Clinton to 
expand NATO.8 Stephen Flanagan, writing as the former Associate Director of the U.S. State 
Department’s Policy Planning Staff 1989-1995, supports Sarotte’s arguments and makes a 
valuable contribution to our understanding about the key role Bush played as well.9 
  Importantly, both scholars’ analysis advance our understanding of the formulation of the 
Partnership for Peace (PFP) program and how it was adopted early on as a viable alternative to 
NATO enlargement, but then eventually jettisoned in favor of a more rapid process of expansion. 
These debates are critical to understand because it was the abandonment of the PFP that created 
one of the earliest fissures in U.S.-Russia relations that would preclude Russia from joining 
NATO. 
While Goldgeier and Sarotte’s analysis are seminal, other scholars such as David 
Kupchan, Kimberly Marten and Ronald Asmus share in the assessment that it was a core group 
of advisors that “deftly outmaneuvered” the opposition, demonstrating how PFP’s early support 
and momentum as the preferred policy choice was overcome.10 With pro-NATO expansion 
supporters having effectively sidelined the PFP program, the one viable alternative to NATO was 
effectively killed. As later sections of this paper will demonstrate, this turn of events would 
prove costly in achieving any larger Russian integration with NATO. 
 
                                                 
8 Sarotte, "How to Enlarge NATO”, 11-12.; Mary Elise Sarotte. "Perpetuating US Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to 
“bribe the Soviets Out” and Move NATO In." International Security 35, no. 1 (2010): 110. 
9 Stephen J. Flanagan, “NATO From Liaison to Enlargement: A Perspective from the State Department and the 
National Security Council 1990–1999,” in Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War, ed. 
Daniel S. Hamilton and Kristina Spohr, (Washington, D.C.: Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 
Johns Hopkins University, 2019), 93-116. 
10  Asmus, Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade itself for a New Era, 372; Marten, "NATO 
Enlargement: Evaluating its Consequences in Russia," , 401; Charles A. Kupchan, "The Origins and Future of 
NATO Enlargement," Contemporary Security Policy 21, no. 2 (2000), 127-148. 
 7 
Russian Perspectives 
Status & Russian Identity 
  To understand Russian opposition to NATO enlargement we need to comprehend the 
importance and centrality of Russian identity in the formulation of their foreign policy more 
broadly. The most interesting scholarship examining the role of Russian identity is centered 
around the idea of status in international politics and their “great power standing,” especially in 
relation to the West.11 While notions of Russian exceptionalism has been historically important 
to Russia’s sense of self, the end of the Cold War and the ensuing economic and political turmoil 
challenged Russia’s sense of greatness. Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, using 
social identity theory to evaluate Russia’s behavior after the Cold War argue that Russia’s 
“unsettled identity” has “led to an obsession with international status and great power standing,” 
always seeking to be seen as equal to the U.S.12 Consequently, as Larson and Shevchenko 
demonstrate, Russia felt marginalized during the NATO enlargement debates, especially since 
they were largely dependent on the West’s financial aid.13  
Larson and Shevchenko are not alone in their assessment. For example, scholarship by 
Borawski,14 Hall,15  Sushentsov and Wohlforth,16 and Kuzio17 demonstrate an evolution of 
Russian foreign policy in which they sought greater parity and consultation with the U.S. after 
the Cold War. As these scholars point out, Russian foreign policy became more assertive in the 
                                                 
11  Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. 
Primacy," International Security 34, no. 4 (2010), 63.  
12 Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers”, 79. 
13 Ibid., 80. 
14  John Borawski. "If Not NATO Enlargement: What does Russia Want?" European Security 5, no. 3 (1996), 381-
395. 
15 Gregory Hall. "NATO and Russia, Russians and NATO: A Turning Point in Post-Cold War East-West 
Relations?" World Affairs 162, no. 1 (1999), 22. 
16  Sushentsov, A.A., Wohlforth, W.C., "The Tragedy of US–Russian Relations: NATO Centrality and the 
Revisionists’ Spiral," 427–450 
17 Taras Kuzio. "NATO Enlargement: The View from the East." European Security 6, no. 1 (1997a): 48-62 
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1992-1993 timeframe as they sought to reclaim its great power status and challenge the West’s 
initiative to expand NATO and the alliance’s involvement abroad, specifically in the former 
Yugoslavia. 
Notably, Russian identity did not only result in Russian resistance, but paradoxically, it 
also animated their desire for greater cooperation and consultation. Indeed, as Hall points out, 
Russian government and foreign policy officials in 1993 stressed the importance of “fostering 
cooperation with the West and Western institutions while maintaining its great power status.”18 
The notion of seeking cooperation is important because, as Sushentsov and Wohlforth point out, 
it reflects Russia’s “long-standing preference [for] multipolarity” and their “core preference for 
great-power parity in setting the global agenda.”19 What this line of scholarship argues is that 
much of Russia’s animosity towards NATO enlargement stems from what Russia perceives to be 
the U.S. and the West’s disregard for their identity as a great power and their refusal to see and 
deal with them as equals. 
Elite and Domestic Opinion 
 Building on the preceding section, scholarship looking at Russia’s opposition to NATO 
enlargement has also examined the role of government and military officials’ opinions, rooted in 
their larger views of Russian identity, and how their views shaped official government positions. 
 The most prominent line of analysis in this area has been conducted by William 
Zimmerman who has conducted qualitative and quantitative survey analysis to assess Russian’s 
                                                 
18 Hall, “NATO and Russia,” 23. 
19 Sushentsov and Wohlforth, “NATO Centrality,” 440. 
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perspectives about NATO enlargement from both the viewpoints of Russian elites (government 
officials, military officers) and regular Russians.20  
For Zimmerman, NATO expansion took on far greater importance for Russian elites than 
the general public and was an issue for elites for far longer.21 Zimmerman argues that 
understanding attitudinal shifts, especially among the elites, is worth examining because they 
“coincide[d] with official views” and demonstrate the extent to which they affected Russian-
NATO policy.22 Russian scholar and academic, Andrei Zagorski, while not conducting original 
survey research like Zimmerman, nevertheless makes an important, but brief, contribution with 
his analysis, demonstrating how opinions shifted in parliament and the rest of the government 
towards opposition as NATO expansion accelerated. 
Importantly, other scholars like Kimberly Marten,23 Gregory Hall,24 Taras Kuzio,25 and 
Alexander Sergounin26 extend Zimmerman’s findings, arguing that Russian domestic politics 
and nationalism exacerbated Russian opposition to NATO expansion as the views of the 
government elite gained prominence and effected the decisions of the Yeltsin government, 
precluding him from taking a more conciliatory approach towards NATO or accepting a 
diminished role for Russia in Europe. Notably, in Kuzio’s analysis of Russian elite’s attitudes, he 
demonstrates that Russian hostility to NATO stems from the “legacy of Soviet influence which 
                                                 
20 William Zimmerman. "NATO Expansion Past and Future: A Closer Look,” in The Russian People and Foreign 
Policy, 187-215: Princeton University Press, 2002.; William Zimmerman. "Survey Research and Russian 
Perspectives on NATO Expansion." Post-Soviet Affairs 17, no. 3 (May 15, 2013): 235-261. 
21 Zimmerman, “Survey Research and Russian Perspectives,” 239. 
22 Ibid., 190. 
23 Kimberly Marten. "NATO Enlargement: Evaluating its Consequences in Russia." International Politics 57, no. 3 
(2020). 
24 Hall, Gregory O. "NATO and Russia, Russians and NATO: A Turning Point in Post-Cold War East-West 
Relations?" World Affairs 162, no. 1 (1999): 22. 
25 Kuzio, Taras. "Nato Enlargement: The View from the East." European Security 6, no. 1 (1997b): 48-62. 
26 Sergounin, Alexander A. "Russian Domestic Debate on NATO Enlargement: From Phobia to Damage 
Limitation." European Security, 6, no. 4 (1997): 55-71. 
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still permeates its power ministries and diplomatic communities.”27 Furthermore, Moscow’s 
hostility towards the alliance is rooted in its “inheritance” of former “Soviet diplomatic 
personnel, Moscow-based think tanks, Soviet general staff, ruling bodies of the KGB and former 
Soviet central media” all of which combined to sow the seeds of distrust about NATO and 
exerted pressure on the government to adopt a more adversarial stance towards enlargement.28  
The preceding body of literature demonstrates that Russian opposition is rooted at a more 
fundamental level of Russian identity, which in turn informed the views of the Russian elite. 
Regardless of the details of NATO expansion, the arguments made by the West to allay any 
Russian fears likely could not have been overcome because NATO expansion was anathema to 
Russia’s sense of self, and with widespread opposition throughout the Russian bureaucracy, any 
idea of joining NATO was likely not a realistic option given the underlying dynamics of identity, 
nationalism and elite viewpoints.        
Impact of International Crisis 
 Any assessment of NATO expansion must be understood within the context of a number 
of international crisis, especially the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. At the end of the Cold 
War, the descent in to ethnic and sectarian violence in the Balkans, particularly in Bosnia, and 
then later, Kosovo, proved central to the Clinton administration’s NATO expansion calculations. 
As will be shown, it was also a significant concern for Russia and source of tension in the U.S.-
Russia-NATO relationship. 
 A variety of secondary sources and scholarly articles that draw upon previously classified 
material and correspondence and interviews with government officials; memoirs from key 
Clinton administration advisors; and other writing from U.S. and Russian government personnel 
                                                 
27 Kuzio, NATO Enlargement: The View from the East, 53.  
28 Ibid.  
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provide us with a unique understanding of how the Balkans’ deteriorating situation informed the 
Clinton administration’s decision making on NATO expansion and Russia’s reaction.29 
   In attempting to understand the Balkan crisis and its correlation to the NATO expansion 
debates, some scholars have focused on the broader European security environment and 
Europe’s security institutions in which the Balkans were collapsing. For example, William Hill’s 
larger level analysis enables him to identify a pivotal turning point in the alliance’s purpose and 
the theoretical basis for its existence: the end of the Cold War and the instability produced from 
Yugoslavia’s collapse which forced NATO to transition from a “collective defense organization 
to a collective security organization.”30 
Hill’s identification of this pivot point is notable because it reinforces the views 
expressed in other literature about the role of the Balkans crisis on NATO enlargement. For 
instance, in Ronald Asmus’ excellent memoir, he recounts Ambassador Madeline Albright’s 
views that the Baltic issue was a “litmus test of NATO enlargement” and needed to be viewed as 
part of a larger European “integrationist strategy.”31 Moreover, a compendium of scholarship 
published in 2019 by senior officials in the U.S. government at the time reinforces the centrality 
                                                 
29 Not exhaustive, but notable journal articles, books, and memoirs providing important insights: Timothy A. 
Sale, Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019.; 
Angela Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations In the Twenty-First Century. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014.; Strobe Talbot, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential 
Diplomacy. New York: Random House, 2002.; James Goldgeier and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, "Evaluating 
NATO Enlargement: Scholarly Debates, Policy Implications, and Roads Not Taken." International Politics 57, no. 3 
(2020): 291; Gerald B. H. Solomon and Center for Strategic and International Studies. The NATO Enlargement 
Debate, 1990-1997: Blessings of Liberty. The Washington Papers. Vol. 174. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998.; 
Kimberly Marten, "NATO Enlargement: Evaluating its Consequences in Russia." International Politics, 57, no. 3 
(2020).; Itzkowitz Shifrinson, Joshua R. "Deal Or no Deal? the End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit 
NATO Expansion." International Security 40, no. 4 (2016); Ronald J. Bee. "Boarding the NATO Train: 
Enlargement and National Interests." Contemporary Security Policy 21, no. 2 (2000a): 149-169.; John Borawski, "If 
Not NATO Enlargement: What does Russia Want?" European Security 5, no. 3 (1996a): 381-395. 
30 William H. Hill, No Place for Russia: European Security Institutions since 1989. Woodrow Wilson Center Press 
Series. New York: Columbia University Press, 2018. 
31 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade itself for a New Era. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002. 
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of the Balkans crisis to NATO expansion.32 Moreover, first person accounts from Russian 
officials and other NATO-allied countries from the same publication share a similar view as their 
American counterparts, detailing how important the unfolding crisis was within their respective 
governments and the role it played in exacerbating tensions with Russia.33   
While much of the scholarship focuses on the role of the Balkans crises during the 1990s 
broadly, it should be noted that a number of scholars ascribe particular importance to events in 
Kosovo specifically, identifying the Kosovo war as perhaps the greatest threat to NATO-Russia 
relations.34 As the previously noted scholars argue, Russia became incensed over NATO 
airstrikes in Kosovo because they were unilateral, targeted Russia’s “Slavic kinsman,” lacked 
UNSC approval, and again ignored Russian interests on a major security issue in Europe.35 As 
Baker, Marten, Smith and Hill show, the U.S.’ end-around of the UNSC cut deep and violated 
Russia’s sense of identity as a great power, causing major reputational damage to NATO inside 
Russia.   
Historiography Conclusion 
What this historiography has shown is the diversity in methods in which scholars and 
historians have approached the examination of NATO expansion. Moreover, the methodological 
variance demonstrates the complexity of the issue, and properly understanding NATO 
enlargement entails weaving together the various schools of thought to provide a holistic view of 
                                                 
32 Daniel S. Hamilton, Kristina Spohr. Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War. 
Washington, D.C.: Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2019. 
33 Ibid., In particular, see first-person accounts by Andrei Kozyrev, Andrei Zagorski and Part V: The Russian 
Conundrum and the Balkan Backdrop.  
34 Martin A Smith. "A Bumpy Road to an Unknown Destination? NATO‐Russia Relations, 1991–2002." European 
Security 11, no. 4 (2002): 59-77.; James A. Baker. "Russia in NATO?" Washington Quarterly 25, no. 1 (2001): 95.; 
Kimberly Marten. "NATO Enlargement: Evaluating its Consequences in Russia." International Politics 57, no. 3 
(2020).; William H. Hill No Place for Russia: European Security Institutions since 1989. Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press Series. New York: Columbia University Press, 2018. 
35 Baker, “Russia in NATO?” 
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enlargement. However, while the existing literature is notable for how vast it is, it is equally 
notable for its absences. The broad consensus that exists points to a lack of literature that probes 
this very consensus, challenging the major historical works, their narratives, and assumptions. 
That is, there is no scholarship that endeavors to refute the major schools of thought discussed 
above or that attempts to prevent a counter-narrative to them. 
For example, while those scholars within the Institutional and Bureaucratic school 
provide a unique perspective of the Clinton administration’s internal deliberations, they both rely 
on similar sourcing and narratives and build upon one another’s works. While scholarly 
agreement can point to a true consensus, what is lacking is scholarship that presents 
countervailing viewpoints that do not rely on the same views of the same scholars, and the views 
of the same political players. Scholarship that seeks to draw upon other first-hand accounts from 
others within the national security bureaucracy may challenge the prevailing notion that it was a 
small group of highly influential advisors that outmaneuvered the rest of the bureaucracy.  
Additionally, readers assessing scholarship that focuses on elite and domestic opinion 
should keep in mind the differences between Western standards of feeling free to voice one’s 
true opinion versus those in Russia, particularly in the 1990s. That is, while the methodologies 
employed in the scholarship may be rigorous, one must also keep in mind that Russian elite 
opinions may be compelled to maintain the “party line” and thus are not a true representation of 
their views, which may call in to question the validity and usefulness of such data.  
Lastly, what is still lacking is an attempt to isolate one or more of the variables of 
enlargement and test it against the historical record in order to identify whether those variables 
could be determined to be a root-cause for Russia’s failure to join NATO. The remainder of this 
paper attempts to do just that.     
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Hypothesis and Methods 
 
This research paper is attempting to answer how and why Russia failed to become 
integrated into NATO during the debates surrounding NATO expansion in the 1990s. To this 
end, this paper hypothesizes that Russia’s discontentment with the PFP and NATO’s Kosovo 
campaign served as “rupture points” in the relationship that ultimately precluded them from 
joining. 
 To answer this question, this paper will utilize a historical methods approach. While 
NATO enlargement is a broad topic spanning many years, this paper will focus on two discreet 
historical moments of the larger NATO enlargement debate: The Partnership for Peace Program 
and the Kosovo war. By utilizing recently declassified primary source documents, this paper will 
construct a broader narrative about the arguments surrounding PFP and NATO involvement in 
the Balkans. Additionally, analysis of primary source documents will be supplemented by 
assessing secondary sources, memoirs, diaries and recently published, firsthand recollections 
from U.S. and Russian government officials to construct a more comprehensive picture.    
 There are a number of limitations with this approach that must be acknowledged. The 
first limitation is that of language. The author does not speak Russia which constrains their 
ability to access Russian primary documents and scholarly articles written from the Russian 
perspective. While there is a notable body of scholarship in English providing a Russian 
perspective, it is nevertheless limiting. Similarly, while declassified U.S. documents are useful in 
so far as they record what Russian officials said, the language barrier prevents one from reading 
Russia’s views of events. Even if language were not a limitation, Russia has not declassified or 
made accessible as many documents as the U.S. so there is an inevitable degree of one-sidedness 
which could alter the study.  
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 Lastly, this study was unable to include interviews with policy makers directly involved 
in the NATO expansion debates. While the study draws upon the available memoirs and diaries 
of the key architects, what is missing are the views and experiences of the policy makers within 
the bureaucracy who were directly charged with drafting and implementing the policies. Such 
views could present valuable counterpoints to the prevailing published views and provide 
additional data-points to measure the hypothesis against and therefore impact the study’s 
conclusions.  
Data 
Partnership for Peace (PFP) 
The deteriorating situation in Bosnia, combined with Clinton’s personal desire for 
America to maintain a leadership role in Europe’s political and security affairs put NATO’s 
future at the top of President Clinton’s foreign policy agenda early in his first year in office. With 
Clinton receptive to the idea of enlarging NATO – in large part due to the prodding by central 
and eastern European states – his administration undertook an interagency review of NATO and 
began developing the President’s agenda in preparation for his attendance at the January 1994 
NATO summit. The most prominent outcome of this interagency review process was the 
formulation of the Partnership for Peace Program which Clinton unveiled at the summit in 
Brussels.  
The unsettled security environment in Europe led the administration to develop the PFP 
as a mechanism to anchor and integrate newly independent European states within Western 
institutions. PFP was intended to provide an avenue in which non-NATO European countries 
could become operationally associated with NATO, increase military ties, and it would be open 
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to all nonaligned nations, including Russia and Ukraine.36 Importantly, the U.S. viewed PFP as 
the viable long-term security solution Europe had been seeking since the end of the Cold War, 
and a stepping-stone to eventual NATO membership.37  
NATO formally announced the PFP program at the 1994 NATO summit alongside 
Clinton’s most forceful public remarks about expanding NATO and articulating the program’s 
true purpose: “...[PFP] will advance a process of evolution for NATO’s formal enlargement. It 
looks to the day when NATO will take on new members who assume the Alliance’s full 
responsibilities.”38 Speaking in Prague following the summit, Clinton pushed the enlargement 
agenda forward: “While the Partnership is not NATO membership, neither is it a permanent 
holding room. It changes the entire NATO dialog so that now the question is no longer whether 
NATO will take on new members but when and how.”39 With Clinton firmly on the record and 
committed to expanding NATO, the issue of pacing, timing, and sequencing took on increased 
importance, splitting the administration into a pro-expansion faction that supported full NATO 
membership immediately versus those lobbying for a gradual, phased approach to expansion, 
working through the PFP. 
 The pro-expansion camp led by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and other 
senior officials at the Department of State and the National Security Council were responsible for 
advocating a more aggressive expansion policy and for turning the President’s rhetoric at the 
NATO summit into reality. The earliest evidence we have of the Administration’s intentions is a 
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September 1993 memo from Lin Davis, under-secretary for arms control and international 
security affairs, to Secretary of State Warren Christopher.40 The memo envisioned a new role for 
NATO in Europe, advocated rapidly expanding NATO, outlined the criteria for joining, and 
included a timetable for various country’s admittance, to include Russia and Ukraine.41 While 
Lake, and others, viewed NATO expansion as central to the administration’s larger goal of 
expanding democracy, others in the administration, including State’s regional bureaus, were 
opposed to a fast-track approach on the grounds that it would up-end U.S.-Russia relations and 
sour other policy priorities, favoring a more gradualist approach to expansion that would slowly 
bring Russia along in the process.  
Meanwhile, while State was split into factions, the Department of Defense was 
universally opposed to a rapid expansion as well. Secretary of Defense William Perry and 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, wanted to emphasize the PFP and 
believed expansion should be “sequential,” and “countries would participate in PFP for a number 
of years” at which point the alliance would discuss expanding.42    
It should be noted that as a policy matter, expanding NATO was broadly supported. 
However, the tension between the pro-expansion camp and the “gradualists” was rooted in the 
issue of timing and sequencing, and whether new NATO members would be immediately 
granted full membership, to include article 5 protections (an attack on one country is considered 
an attack on the whole alliance). This distinction will become an important tension point in the 
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U.S-Russia relationship as primary source documents reveal Russian skepticism about PFP and 
the pacing of enlargement.   
Russia’s Perspective: NATO Enlargement & PFP 
Well before the possibility of NATO enlargement broke in to the public debate and 
Russian suspicions about NATO grew deeper, the future of Russian relations towards NATO had 
been broached as early as December 1991 when President Yeltsin sent a letter to NATO 
countries stating that “we are raising the question of Russia’s admission to NATO, although we 
are prepared to regard this as a long-term political goal.”43 Concurrently, while Russia was 
beginning to position itself vis a vis NATO in late 1991, in the U.S., the Bush administration was 
laying the groundwork for NATO enlargement and the framework and plans for PFP “[were] 
well developed by the end of 1992.”44 Thus, both countries in the early 1990s were each laying 
the foundation for their respective positions, attempting to maneuver their countries on to 
favorable policy grounds. As the Clinton administration picked up where Bush left off and more 
fully developed the PFP program, 1993 would prove pivotal in Russia’s understanding of U.S. 
intentions about NATO enlargement broadly, and PFP specifically. 
President Yeltsin was aware that Clinton was reviewing NATO’s status and considering 
the alliance’s future in 1993, and decided to send a letter that September as a way to register his 
country’s concerns about the possibility of NATO expanding and in hopes of influencing the 
President’s thinking.45 The letter lays out his opposition to NATO expansion expressing 
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concerns with Clinton’s discussions about “the scenario of quantitative expansion” by adding 
“East European countries.”46 The letter also makes clear Russia’s desire to integrate with 
European security architectures and that there are other options for the U.S. and Russia to 
cooperate and collectively address the continent’s security issues.   
A month later in October, Secretary Christopher traveled to Moscow to first meet with 
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, and then President Yeltsin in order to preview the PFP and 
the following year’s NATO summit agenda. In his meeting with Kozyrev, Christopher 
acknowledged Russia’s concerns about NATO expanding and assured him that there would be 
“no immediate provision for new memberships,” (meaning NATO) and that the PFP would be 
open to all countries.47 However, the memo does reflect the possibility of “eventual [NATO] 
membership” based on a country’s performance in PFP.48 To clarify whether the administration 
sought to immediately expand NATO, Kozyrev asks more “pointedly whether there would not be 
two or three new members now?”, but Christopher assures him “no,” and that the U.S. was 
instead “emphasizing the [PFP].”49  
Later that day in his meeting with Yeltsin, Christopher relayed that as a result of his 
September letter, it was the U.S.’ view that “there could be no recommendation to ignore or 
exclude Russia from full participation in the future security of Europe” and that the PFP would 
not exclude anyone nor “push anyone ahead of the others.”50 At this point, the memo notes that 
Yeltsin seeks clarification as to whether central and Eastern European and newly independent 
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states would be on “equal footing and there would be partnership and not membership?” 
Christopher replies “yes, that is the case, there would not even be an associate status.”51 At this 
reassurance, Yeltsin is ecstatic, claiming the plan “dissipates” all of Russia’s “tension[s] 
regarding East European states and their aspirations with respect to NATO,” further noting that 
under the PFP, everyone will be assured “equal participation on the basis of partnership.”52 
However, the record indicates that after Yeltsin’s enthusiasm, Christopher added that “in due 
course [we will] be looking at the question of [NATO] membership as a longer term 
eventuality.”53  
This crucial caveat may have gone unnoticed, or as Christopher and Strobe Talbot 
recount in their memoirs, Yeltsin only heard what he wanted to, namely that PFP was the NATO 
alternative instead of a pathway, and that Russia would be included in the European security 
system in the future. In Christopher’s recounting of the meeting, Yeltsin was “emanating heavy 
alcohol fumes” and he thought he was drunk.54 Talbot supports this observation, recounting 
Yeltsin delivering a “long, barely coherent boast” which precluded Yeltsin from understanding 
the U.S.’ true message: “PFP today, enlargement tomorrow.”55 Foreign Minister Kozyrev, in 
recalling this meeting in 2019, seems to have comprehended the U.S.’ true intention at the time, 
acknowledging after the meeting that “the new policy was not instead of but rather a pathway to 
enlargement.” All these years later, Kozyrev remains confused as to why Christopher and Talbot 
did not finish their presentation without “clarifying the issue” for Yeltsin himself. Kozyrev 
recalls that others in the Russian government began to caution Yeltsin that Clinton deceived him 
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and the “PFP was a trick to draw East Europeans into NATO, leaving Russia in the cold.”56 
Despite these cautions, Kozyrev himself supports Christopher and Talbot’s assertion that Yeltsin 
preferred to hear what he felt like hearing.57   
Throughout 1994, the U.S. and NATO continued to provide assurances to Russia that 
NATO enlargement was not meant to be exclusionary nor anti-Russian. In fact, a June 1994 
NATO communique stated that “our relationship with Russia, including in appropriate areas 
outside the Partnership for Peace, will be developed over time,”58 reaffirming for Russia that 
NATO sought additional cooperative arrangements even beyond PFP. As Martin Smith notes, 
NATO members up to this point had rejected any side deals above and beyond PFP, so the 
language in the communique marked a key concession to Russia to persuade them to join 
NATO.59  Moreover, during President Yeltsin’s visit to Washington, D.C. later that same year, 
according to Strobe Talbot, Clinton told Yeltsin that while NATO would expand, there was no 
imminent timetable and that the U.S. was “emphasizing inclusion, not exclusion.” In Talbot’s 
retelling, Clinton goes out of his way to assuage Yeltsin’s fears about NATO expansion and PFP, 
and even promises him that “U.S. policy would be guided by the motto, “the three no’s”: no 
surprises, no rush and no exclusion” to which Yeltsin said he “understood.”60  
Not long after though, Yeltsin learned of the administration’s NATO enlargement interagency 
planning process which included a Pentagon study about the mechanics of enlarging NATO.61 
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Yeltsin writes President Clinton on November 29, 1994, expressing his incomprehension at the 
reasons behind speeding up the discussion on the “broadening of NATO.”62 Yeltsin warns that 
an “expedited timetable” will be interpreted as “the beginning of a new split in Europe” and 
closes his letter by confirming Russia’s continued interest in “profound cooperation with 
NATO.”63 Shortly thereafter, Kozyrev pulled out of talks to finalize Russia’s PFP membership 
because Russia objected to a NATO statement announcing the initiation of a process to examine 
how NATO would enlarge.64 Without having been given prior warning, Russia viewed the 
announcement as a “surprise” and accused Clinton of violating his “no surprises” pledge. This 
event perpetuated the belief inside Russia that NATO and the U.S. were trying to “covertly 
initiate an enlargement process”65 and prompted Yeltsin to accuse Clinton of “sowing the seeds 
of mistrust” and ushering in an era of “cold peace” in Europe.66 The resulting mistrust delayed 
Russia’s entrance to PFP until May 1995.  
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To appropriately assess how NATO’s expansion affected U.S.-Russia relations we have 
to understand the larger regional context in which the debates were happening and how external 
security crisis – specifically the Bosnia and Kosovo wars – were intertwined with and informed 
Russia’s opposition to NATO enlargement.  
 Before President Clinton took office in 1993, and well before NATO enlargement gained 
momentum, the UN Security Council had approved a resolution in 1992 which permitted NATO 
to intervene in Bosnia on humanitarian grounds, provided support for the peacekeeping mission, 
and enabled a no-fly zone enforced by NATO airstrikes.67 Notably, while Russia had voted “yes” 
on the resolution, it was initially considered a mistake within Russia and created a split within 
the government, with the Duma criticizing the decision as not being sufficiently pro-Serb.68  
Despite early Russian opposition, Kimberly Marten makes an important contribution to 
our understanding of how NATO involvement in Bosnia was being considered by Russia in 
relation to NATO expansion during the 1992-1993 timeframe. According to her interview with 
Kozyrev and Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s UN Ambassador, NATO-led operations were “never tied 
to questions about NATO territorial enlargement” and if opposition was growing to NATO’s 
intervention, “it was not (yet) because of geographical expansion plans.”69 Writing three years 
later in 2020 in a separate analysis, Marten makes a similar argument, pointing out that the 
Bosnian airstrikes and NATO enlargement were not “logically connected” at that time as the 
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airstrikes “occurred before enlargement started, and enlargement did not…increase NATO’s 
ability to carry-out airstrikes.”70 Marten’s interviews are notable because they present an 
important data-point that suggests the Balkans conflict and opposition to NATO enlargement are 
not causally connected. 
 As the security situation deteriorated in 1994, Russia began to register more forceful 
objections about the increasing frequency of NATO airstrikes which threatened to derail Russia 
joining the PFP. Russia’s disenchantment with events in Bosnia also coincided with the larger 
NATO enlargement debate which was gaining traction, and it became increasingly impossible to 
separate consternation over NATO expansion with NATO involvement in Bosnia. Despite 
Russia’s apprehensions though, they still elected to send a small peacekeeping force to Bosnia at 
the war’s conclusion. Notably, this decision coincided with Russia’s decision to officially join 
the PFP.  
The evidence and arguments suggest that Russian objections to NATO enlargement were 
not causally linked to NATO involvement in Bosnia early in the conflict. Rather, the two issues 
would not become intertwined until later in 1994 and accelerate through the mid-1990s, 
culminating in vociferous opposition over NATO’s involvement in Kosovo in 1999. 
Kosovo 
Regardless of Russia’s willingness to participate in Bosnia peace process, they harbored 
resentments about the war’s conduct and their anger festered. They resented the manner in which 
they were being treated by the West, feeling their security interests and historical linkages with 
Serbia were not being properly considered, and they resented their diminished power to stand up 
to the U.S., to NATO, and their inability to slow NATO’s inexorable growth east. With attention 
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focused inwardly on domestic political turmoil in Russia and outwardly on achieving a peace 
settlement in Bosnia and Croatia, the uprising of ethnic Albanians against Serbian rule in Kosovo 
was largely ignored. However, as the situation deteriorated, Belgrade’s brutal response refocused 
NATO and Russia’s attention on the unfolding crisis in Kosovo. 
Efforts to resolve the Kosovo crisis centered around the international community’s push 
to persuade Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to grant autonomy to Kosovo and agree to an 
international peacekeeping force. The historical record reveals that Moscow and the U.S. shared 
a common view of the need to work together to solve the crisis. In a May 1998 conversation 
between Clinton and Yeltsin, Clinton goes so far as to tell Yeltsin that unless the U.S. and Russia 
continue to work directly together, there is “no way” to prevent Serbs and Albanians from 
“killing each other”.71 Interestingly, in the same conversation, the two also discussed the need 
for a UN peacekeeping mission to remain in Macedonia, just to Bosnia’s south. The record 
reveals that Yeltsin is in total agreement with Clinton about the need for a UN force to remain 
and not be replaced by NATO. Yeltsin tells Clinton that “NATO would be an elephant in the 
China shop” if the UN presence in Macedonia was eliminated in favor of a NATO presence.72 
The exchange is notable as it represents the first instance in which Yeltsin expresses concern 
about any NATO involvement in the context of the Kosovo crisis, presaging Yeltsin’s growing 
concern about NATO’s increasing involvement in the region. 
The following month, Clinton and Yeltsin spoke about Kosovo at greater length. Most 
notable from the call-logs is Yeltsin’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric regarding NATO, warning 
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Clinton that “any use of force by NATO is inadmissible.”73 Yeltsin doubles-down: “Bill, I think 
it is inadmissible that the Security Council of the United Nations should sanction the use of force 
against a sovereign state…And if there should be a strike by NATO against Yugoslavia without 
UN Security Council sanction, that would be considered a blow to cooperation between Russia 
and NATO.”74 Clinton agrees about needing to work through the UN, but he does not appear to 
close the door entirely on NATO action, instead, simply expressing his “hope” that it won’t be 
necessary. So, while Clinton appears to be saying the right things that may appease Yeltsin, he 
seems to be keeping the door open for future NATO involvement too.  
The next time the two President’s spoke in August, Clinton tells Yeltsin that if the Serb 
offensive against the Albanians does not stop, the U.S. would be “forced to respond with or 
without the UN.”75 The ensuing exchanges between the two men show Yeltsin taking great pains 
to emphasize mutual cooperation through the UN, the need for a negotiated solution and to avoid 
a military intervention, and Clinton patiently, but firmly pushing back against Yeltsin. It is a 
remarkable exchange in that it represents the first time Clinton begins to sow the seeds of 
NATO’s eventual military involvement and Yeltsin doing everything he can rhetorically to avoid 
the outcome. 
NATO would ultimately commence air strikes against Serbia in March 1999 despite 
Russian protests. Throughout the Kosovo crisis, Russian diplomats had waged a vigorous 
diplomatic campaign to prevent military intervention, and as the declassified conversations 
show, these concerns were made known and discussed repeatedly at the highest levels. Only 
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three and half hours before NATO bombs would reach Serbia, Clinton calls Yeltsin to notify him 
that the strikes were inbound and hoped that their disagreement over NATO’s involvement in 
Serbia would not ruin everything else they could work on. Yeltsin was blunt: “I’m afraid we 
shall not succeed in that.”76 Yeltsin, failing to make a desperate appeal to their personal 
friendship to pull back the strikes, ends the call by noting that this will likely cause a split 
between Russia and the U.S. and NATO, and that he will not be able to “turn the heads of [his] 
people, the heads of the politicians towards the West, towards the United States.”77 In effect, 
Yeltsin was presaging Russia’s coming rupture with NATO.  
 While Yeltsin harbored his own feelings about NATO involvement, Russia’s domestic 
politics and internal governmental opposition weighed on Yeltsin just as heavily. In his diaries, 
Yeltsin recollects being warned by his opponents that if NATO was willing to bomb Belgrade, 
then they would be willing to bomb Moscow: “Today Yugoslavia, tomorrow Russia!” Yeltsin 
asks, “wasn’t it obvious that each missile directed against Yugoslavia was an indirect strike 
against Russia?”78 Moreover, opposition within the political ranks was so well known by the 
U.S. that they only notified Prime Minister Primakov about the impending strikes hours before, 
and when he heard the news, he was so enraged, he directed his plane to be turned around which 
was enroute to Washington. Additionally, Russian public sentiment became increasingly hostile 
to NATO as well because of the air strikes: when the hostilities concluded “96 percent of 
Russians either agreed or totally agreed that NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia is a crime against 
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humanity, and 77 percent either agreed or totally agreed that there is nothing stopping NATO 
from getting involved in Russia as it did in Yugoslavia.”79    
 The historical record suggests that Russia’s reaction to the Kosovo bombings could have 
been predicted. Considering how vociferously Russia had objected to the strikes, it came as little 
surprise when Russia broke off all ties with NATO and the Permanent Joint Council, potentially 
signaling the start of a wider, permanent break with the alliance that would forever preclude 
Russia from joining NATO. Despite what the evidence suggests, some scholars argue that a more 
nuanced look at Russia’s reaction is warranted and suggests that Kosovo did not cause 
irreparable harm to the Russia-NATO partnership. 
 Martin Smith argues this point most persuasively. Smith points out that despite Russia 
severing ties with NATO, Russia’s moves were actually carefully “calibrated and targeted,” and 
that Russia’s actions are notable for what they “did not do.”80 For instance, Yeltsin ignored calls 
from the ruling communist party to end its military presence in Bosnia, they did not sever 
diplomatic ties with NATO governments, including the U.S., and most notably, when NATO 
bombs failed to dislodge Milosevich, despite Russia’s deep opposition and anger, they 
diplomatically maneuvered themselves to play a pivotal role in negotiating a settlement and 
bringing the war to an end.81 Moreover, despite a charged stand-off between Russian forces and 
NATO troops near Pristina airport which almost led to open hostilities and a broader 
confrontation, Russia agreed to participate in the NATO-led peacekeeping Kosovo Force 
(KFOR), some of whom came under operational and tactical control of the U.S.82 When Russia’s 
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actions are viewed in this context, the evidence could suggest that NATO’s bombing of Kosovo 
wasn’t as big of a flashpoint as some argue. 
 
Discussion 
This study attempted to determine the causes for why Russia never joined NATO during 
the NATO enlargement debates of the 1990s by examining primary source documents, memoirs, 
diaries and secondary sources. By scrutinizing the historic record, this study hoped to isolate the 
PFP and NATO’s Kosovo campaign as the two pivot points in the relationship that ultimately 
form the basis of Russia’s animosity towards the alliance. The evidence suggests a number of 
things. 
First, with respect to the Partnership for Peace Program, the historical record reveals 
Russia expressed significant reservations early on about the PFP. From the outset, Russia’s 
concern centered around trying to understand what the PFP’s true intent was: was it a pathway to 
NATO expansion or was it intended to be an alternative to NATO, and would it preclude Russia 
from participating? The declassified memos from Warren Christopher’s meetings with Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev and President Yeltsin reveal the depth of Russia’s concerns about PFP. In fact, 
what is notable about these two documents is that they reveal the inconsistencies in the U.S.’ 
position about NATO enlargement broadly, and PFP specifically, which ultimately led to 
Russian confusion and resentment towards PFP. In Christopher’s meeting with Kozyrev, he 
makes clear that the administration is emphasizing the PFP leaving the impression that the 
program was an alternative to NATO. The confusion is further compounded in his meeting with 
Yeltsin, when Christopher affirms Yeltsin’s understanding “that all countries in CEE and NIS 
would be on equal footing and there would be a partnership and not a membership.” This led 
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Yeltsin to believe that PFP was in fact the alternative to NATO. Based on just the meeting 
memos, it would be easy to sympathize with Russia’s sense of betrayal about how PFP 
proceeded and Clinton’s subsequent remarks that the program was a pathway to membership. 
However, in reading the memoirs of the participants, to include Kozyrev’s own recollections of 
the meetings, a fuller picture emerges and actually reveals a fundamental misunderstanding by 
Yeltsin about what he actually heard – or chose to hear. The evidence makes clear that the U.S. 
understood it had a communications problem and that their message around PFP was muddled 
which is why the White House dispatched various administration officials to Russia to clarify its 
intentions. Most prominently, Vice President Gore admitted to the confusion and conceded U.S. 
communications was not clear, telling the Russians that their misunderstandings was a result of 
the U.S.’ “inability…to clearly convey to the Russian side what we are talking about.”83 
However, despite repeated attempts by the administration to unwind the initial confusion, what 
Yeltsin heard mattered greatly for the course of Russian participation in PFP because it is 
directly tied to Russia backing out of joining PFP in December 1994.  
However, despite the evidence demonstrating Russia’s angst over PFP, the evidence also 
shows the program was supported by the Russian military, with its senior leaders stating Russia 
would be among the first to sign up, and they “hoped [PFP] would be approved and common 
sense would triumph.”84 Moreover, Russia did eventually join the program in 1995 which calls 
in to question the argument that Russian concerns over PFP was central to their not joining 
NATO. But, it must also be kept in mind that Russia did not renew is participation plan in PFP 
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when it expired just three years later in 1998 and were not active participants in the program. 
Consequently, the evidence points to a mixed record at best. What accounts for it? One logical 
explanation is that realizing enlargement was inevitable, and hoping to minimize its adverse 
effects on Russian interests, Russia hoped to exert some influence over the enlargement process 
and hoped by agreeing to participate in PFP, they could transform the program into a true 
alternative to NATO.85    
Having reviewed the historical record, I do not believe that PFP in and of itself served as 
a decisive factor in Russia not joining NATO because the record is too mixed. Additionally, no 
primary or secondary sources explicitly demonstrate a causal connection in which it is stated that 
PFP undermined Russia’s integration. While PFP is central to the NATO enlargement narrative, 
it has to be thought of as a vehicle to the larger objective of admitting new states to the alliance. 
Consequently, any Russian objection to PFP is rooted more in their broader concerns about 
NATO expansion itself and not necessarily the particulars of PFP.  
Second, with respect to Kosovo, the evidence is equally mixed in some respects. The 
evidence clearly shows that Yeltsin and his government repeatedly warned Clinton and his 
administration in successive conversations over the course of a year about military involvement 
in Kosovo and that NATO engagement would cause irreparable damage to the alliance and to the 
U.S.-Russian relationship. Quite in fact, once the bombing began, the predicted rupture occurred 
with Russia pulling out of the PFP program and severing contact with NATO. However, the 
evidence also shows that these actions were likely more calculated instead of blowing up the 
relationship outright. Indeed, we have to consider the fact that despite Russia’s prior warnings, 
they deftly maneuvered diplomatically to help bring the crisis to an end, secured important 
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concessions for its Serb allies, and were important contributors to the Kosovo peacekeeping 
force through 2003.  
Despite Russia’s eventual participation, the Kosovo bombings resulted in a number of 
profound strategic shifts in Russian foreign policy. For example, Russia began to view the 
second Chechen war through the prism of Kosovo and consciously adopted similar tactics and 
believed that Chechens, like the Kosovar Albanians, had extra-territorial ambitions.86 This new 
prism also informed Russia’s views of other post-Soviet territorial conflicts in places like 
Georgia and Azerbaijan, and prompted a strengthening of military ties with other CIS countries. 
Moreover, whereas Russia’s 1997 strategic review was focused on internal threats, Russia 
revised its military doctrine post-Kosovo to emphasize “the threat of direct military aggression 
against Russia and its allies” and slowed its pace of armed forced reductions.87 While NATO is 
not explicitly mentioned, it is clear the strategic revisions are geared towards confronting NATO. 
Perhaps most profound though, Kosovo effectively killed ratification of the START II treaty at 
the time and prompted Russia to relook its nuclear deterrent.88  
The evidence presented clearly shows that NATO’s involvement in Kosovo created a 
rupture between the alliance and Russia, led to significant shifts in Russian foreign policy, and 
resulted in perhaps the lowest point in U.S.-Russia relations since the end of the Cold War. 
Additionally, while the evidence shows concrete actions Russia took in the wake of the war, 
Kosovo also exacerbated Russia’s larger concerns about NATO enlargement broadly. NATO air 
strikes conducted outside of NATO’s boundaries, combined with bypassing the UNSC – the one 
place Russia retained some form of its original power in the form of a veto – played on Russia’s 
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unresolved issue about status, the psychological scars from the break-up of the Soviet Union and 
the resulting diminishment of their role as a great power. Consequently, NATO actions in the 
Balkans fueled the re-emergence of a latent Russian strategic culture, rooted in Russia’s 
“geographic and spiritual legacy” in which Russia historically sought security “through territorial 
expansion” and believed they were surrounded by enemies.89 Russia’s renewal of this historical 
strategic culture, which laid dormant immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union as 
Russia sought greater cooperation and integration with the West, has resulted in the re-
emergence of a post-Kosovo Russian foreign policy under President Putin that is based on 
“combativeness and competitiveness, perceptions of foreign threat (especially from the United 
States and the West), and political assertiveness bordering on pugnacity.”90    
Conclusion 
Despite the early promise for improved relations after the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
Washington and Moscow have struggled to move forward with a productive relationship, with 
multiple attempts by successive U.S. administrations to “reset” the relationship all to no avail. A 
constructive relationship has failed to materialize for numerous reasons, but one of the most 
prominent legacy issues for today’s adversarial relationship is the issue of NATO expansion, 
which continues to be cited by Russian officials, to include President Putin, as a source of 
today’s tensions.91 Given the centrality NATO occupies in Russian strategic thought in modern 
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times, this research project started out trying to determine what precluded Russia from joining 
NATO during the 1990s. Ultimately, the evidence presented has led to a split conclusion, with 
the Kosovo war triggering a fundamental shift in Russia’s relationship to NATO in concrete 
ways, but no evidence to suggest an equal split occurred because of their opposition to the PFP. 
Despite the mixed results, what is clear from the evidence is that instead of viewing the PFP and 
the Kosovo war as distinct pivot points in the relationship, it would be wiser to viewed them in 
the context of other factors along a continuum of events that ultimately shed light on Russia’s 
failure to join NATO and its continuing animosity toward the alliance. Additionally, the 
preceding analysis raises a number of interesting implications and points to new directions for 
further research as future work will be required because the benefits and drawbacks of the 
alliance remain hotly contested, its future uncertain, and further enlargement continues to be a 
possibility. 
First, while Russian leaders continue to cite NATO expansion as a source of tension, it is 
worth considering the degree to which expansion has caused the relationship to deteriorate in 
comparison to other policies, for instance, the invasion of Iraq and Libya, or support for 
democratic movements in former Soviet satellite-states. That is, future work could attempt to 
assess the legacy of NATO expansion vis-à-vis other contentious Western policies to discern 
whether one policy or another is more or less responsible for worsening relations. Second, future 
research may wish to consider whether NATO expansion has been a net positive or negative for 
U.S. and European security. Proponents argue that expansion enabled European peace and 
positively increased political and economic integration and growth. However, some would argue 
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it has allowed U.S. allies to “freeload” on the American security guarantee and that enlargement 
has been more beneficial to new members but has done nothing to increase U.S. security.92 
Moreover, it was argued that expanding NATO would lead to increased democratization in 
Eastern Europe. As several NATO members have experienced significant backsliding in 
democratic norms, especially in Hungary and Poland, it begs the question of whether expansion 
has lived up to its political promises. Further research is required to assess both the political and 
security dynamics, and whether NATO expansion has lived up to its original promises. Despite 
the amount and diversity of evidence presented in this paper, it is nevertheless limited and cannot 
be considered a full recounting of what actually occurred due to numerous limitations as 
previously discussed, which points to a final avenue for future research: as new sources become 
available, more archives are opened, materials are declassified, and interviews conducted, 
scholars and historians will continually need to probe this evidence and match it against the 
existing historical record. Such efforts will not only enable us to more fully understand NATO 
expansion in a fuller historical context, but will also allow policy makers to better assess the 
outcomes of NATO expansion, and “link” them with “insights about the factors and conditions 
that contribute to peace, economic growth, political influence, and other broadly positive 
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